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COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 -TERM
use" of his vehicle and since the vendor-insured was not in fact the owner of the
vehicle, the insurer could in no way be held liable under the policy.
In Switzer v. Merchants Mutual Casualty Company,2G the vendor-insured was
a conditional vendor who as a dealer was permitted, pursuant to statute,27 to
issue his own plates to the vendee for temporary use. However, for failure to
comply with the exact terms of the statute, he also had been held, in a prior
proceeding,2 8 to be estopped from denying ownership for purposes of deter-
mining his liability to the injured party. In the instant case there was no attempt
to carry over this estoppel to the insurance company, but rather the insurer was
sought to be held for the liability of the vendee, on the ground that the vendee
was an "insured" under the policy. Since the policy in the Switzer case was
issued to an automobile dealer, as contrasted to an individual owner in the Guthiel
case, the Court took a broader view of the risks assumed by the insurer under such
policy. Since the vendee's use was with the "permission" of the dealer, the vendee
was deemed to be an "insured" under the policy, thus rendering the insurer liable
regardless of the dealer's liability.
Thus, in the name of contract construction, the Court has apparently
endeavored to set limits upon the insurer's liability. However, one may wonder
how realistic these limits are in view of our policy of compulsory liability insur-
ance. It would appear that while the risk that a dealer will permit a vendee to
use his plates is apparent, the risk that an individual owner will be held liable by
estoppel under similar circumstances is not so far removed as to warrant the
distinction drawn by the Court.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Notice In Indemnification Action Against Public Corporation
The General Municipal Law requires, as a condition precedent to a law
suit against a public corporation, that notice be given to the public corporation
within 90 days after the claim arises.' In Valstrey Service Corporation v. Board
of Election, Nassan County, the Court stated in a per curiam opinion that notice
was not necessary in a third-party indemnification action against a public
corporation. '-
26. 2 N.Y.2d 575, 161 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1957).
27. N.Y. VEIIICIIE AND TRAFFIC LAW §63.
28. Switzer v. Aldrich, 307 N.Y. 56, 120 N.E.2d 159 (1954).
1. N.Y. GIENFRIA MUNICIPAL LAW §50(e) (1).
2. 2 N.Y.2d .113, 161 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1957).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The petitioner, who was the defendant in a personal injury action, was
seeking indemnification pursuant to section 193(a) of the Civil Practice Act
which permits a defendant to implead a third party in the original law suit.
Since the petitioner was served a summons over 90 days after the claim arose,
it made an application to the Supreme Court for an extension of the time limit
under section 50(e) (5) of the General Municipal Law. That section gives the
court discretion to extend the time for notice for a reasonable period after
90 days. However in order to exercise this discretion, the applicant must be
an infant or mentally or physically incapacitated.: The Supreme Court ruled that
these were the only conditions upon which the application could be granted.
This was affirmed by the Appellate Division.4 The Court of Appeals held that
the lower court was correct in denying the application and further stated as
dictum that notice was not necessary in a third-party indemnification action.
The Court of Appeals gave no arguments to sustain this position but it
seems to have made a valid assumption. Section 50(e) of the General Municipal
Law makes no provision for a third-party action and the legislative intent of the
statute is to give the public corporation adequate opportunity to investigate
the facts while readily available.'
"A statute requiring that notice of claim be given prior to institution of
action against a public corporation should be construed in the light of its
underlying purpose and such a statute is not a trap to catch the unwary or
ignorant."
If notice is required and section 193 (a) of the Civil Practice Act is barred,
the purpose or intent of section 50(e) of the General Municipal Law would be
defeated. The petitioner would have to wait for a judgement against it before it
could give a notice of an indemnity claim. This could take many years and the
public corporation would have a very difficult time acquiring facts. Thus, the
statute would operate as a hindrance, rather than an aid to public corporations.
Municipal Disposal Of Garbage-Governmenfal Funcfion
In Nehrbas v. Incorporated Village of Lloyd Harbor7 the Court held that
a village was not restricted by its zoning restrictions when using residentially
zoned land for the purpose of storing vehicles used by the police force, highway
3. Rudolph v. New York, 191 Misc. 947, 77 N.Y.S.2d 788 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
4. 1 A.D.2d 976, 151 N.Y.S.2d 86 (2d Dep't 1956).
5. Teresta v. City of New York, 304 N.Y. 440, 443, 108 N.E.2d 397, 398 (1952);
Sweeney v. City of New York, 225 N.Y. 271, 273, 122 N.E. 243, 244 (1919).
6. Sandak v. Tuxedo Union School District No. 3, Town of Tuxedo, 308 N.Y.
226, 124 N.E.2d 295 (1954).
7. 2 N.Y.2d 190, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1957).
